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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ADVISORY
OPINIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS UPON
STATE JURISDICTION
BY NICHOLAS UNKOVIC* and JAMES Q. HARTY**
The National Labor Relations Board has issued approximately seventy
advisory opinions pursuant to section 102.98 of its regulations.' This pro-
cedure was promulgated in 1959 "to eliminate the 'no-man's land' between
state and federal jurisdiction by permitting the expeditious resolution of doubts
arising from the applicability of the Board's . . . 'discretionary standards to
the "commerce operations" of an employer.'"2
An advisory opinion will only be delivered when an employer and a labor
union are parties to a pending action before either a state court or a state
administrative agency. If in court, the employer is usually seeking injunctive
relief or damages because of certain union conduct. The defendant union will
file a petition for advisory opinion in support of a claim that the state court
is without jurisdiction over it or over the subject matter of the dispute
because of federal pre-emption. s In some case§ the court itself has petitioned
for an advisory opinion. The employer is usually interested in resisting a
challenge to the jurisdiction of the state court. In the situation where the
employer is before a state administrative agency, perhaps because a union has
charged it with unfair labor practices or because a union is seeking certifica-
tion under state law as collective-bargaining representative, the employer will
argue against the state's assertion of jurisdiction and will attempt to imple-
ment its argument with a petition for an advisory opinion. State agencies,
also, have at times assumed the initiative in seeking an advisory opinion.
* A.B., 1928, Harvard University; LL.B., 1932, Dickinson School of Law; member,
Pennsylvania Bar; partner in the firm of Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.
** A.B., 1949, LaSalle College; M.B.A., 1952, LL.B., 1959, University of Pennsyl-
vania; member, Pennsylvania Bar; associated with the firm of Reed, Smith, Shaw &
McClay, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
1. The section reads as follows:
§ 102.98 Petition for advisory opinion; who may file; where to file.
(a) Whenever a party to a proceeding before any agency or any court of
any State or Territory is in doubt whether the Board would assert jurisdiction
on the basis of its current jurisdictional standards, he may file a petition with
the Board for an advisory opinion on whether it would assert jurisdiction on the
basis of its current standards.
(b) Whenever an agency or court of any State or Territory is in doubt
whether the Board would assert jurisdiction over the parties in a proceeding
pending before such agency or court, the agency or court may file a petition with
the Board for an advisory opinion on whether the Board would decline to assert
jurisdiction on the basis of its current standards.
29 C.F.R. § 102.98 (1963).
2. Interlake S.S. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 576 (1962).
3. E.g., Local 438 Constr. Union v. Curry, 83 Sup. Ct. 531 (1963).
25
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The procedure to secure an advisory opinion is relatively simple. Section
102.99 of the NLRB's regulations sets forth the information required;4
this varies slightly, depending on whether the petitioner is an official state
agency, or a state court, or a private party. The time interval between filing
of the petition and ruling by the Board appears to be considerably shorter
than that required for a full unfair labor practice proceeding; the time
interval is no shorter than that for contested representation proceedings
(where review of the regional director's decision and order is not granted).
There has been no Board delegation of the advisory opinion process to its
regional directors, although section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act conceivably sanctions such delegation. 5 The advisory opinionk petition
when submitted by a private party must state whether there are any other
proceedings before the NLRB in reference to the dispute at hand. It appears
that this information is intended for purposes of avoiding a duplicate or
possibly conflicting jurisdictional determination by the Board."
4. Contents of petition for an advisory opinion.
(a) A petition for an advisory opinion, when filed by a party to a proceeding
before an agency or court of a State or Territory, shall allege the following:
(1) The name of the petitioner.
(2) The names of all other parties to the proceeding.
(3) The name of the agency or court.
(4) The docket number and nature of the proceeding.
(5) The general nature of the business involved in the proceeding.
(6) The commerce data relating to the operations of such business.
(7) Whether the commerce data described in this section are admitted or
denied by other parties to the proceeding.
(8) The findings, if any, of the agency or court respecting the commerce
data described in this section.
(9) Whether a representation or unfair labor practice proceeding involving
the same labor dispute is pending before the Board, and, if so, the case number
thereof.
Petitions under this subsection shall be in writing and signed, and either shall
be sworn to before a notary public, Board agent, or other person duly authorized
by law to administer oaths and take acknowledgments or shall contain a declara-
tion by the person signing it, under the penalties of the Criminal Code, that its
contents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
(b) A petition for an advisory opinion, when filed by an agency or court of
a State or Territory, shall allege the following:
(1) The name of the agency or court.
(2) The names of the parties to the proceeding.
(3) The docket number and nature of the proceeding.
(4) The general nature of the business involved in the proceeding.
(5) The findings of the agency or court, or in the absence of findings, a
statement of the evidence relating to the commerce operations of such business.
29 C.F.R. § 102.99 (1963).
5. The Board is . . . authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers
under section 159 of this title to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of
collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and determine
whether a question of representation exists . . . except that upon the filing of a
request therefor with the Board by any interested person, the Board may review
any action of a regional director delegated to him under this paragraph, but
such a review shall not, unless specifically ordered by the Board, operate as a
stay of any action taken by the regional director.
73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 153(b) (Supp. IV, 1963).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 102.99(a) (9) (1963). If there has been a prior dispute before the
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Classified according to their effect, the roughly seventy opinions handed
down to date fall into three categories:
1. Advisory opinions which state that under the submitted facts the
Board would or would not assert jurisdiction over the employer.
2. Advisory opinions which state that the subject matter of the petition
is beyond the scope of the advisory opinion procedure.
3. Advisory opinions which dismiss the petition because it presents
insufficient commerce information.
The availability of the proceeding was recognized by the Pennsylvania
supreme court in the July, 1963, decision, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd.
v. Butz.7 An employer contended that certain letters from the Regional
Director relating to the withdrawal of an election petition previously filed
with the NLRB could not constitute a declination of jurisdiction s which would
under a provision of the NLRA 9 permit the state agency to assume jurisdic-
tion. The court pointed out that if the employer had doubted that the NLRB
would deny jurisdiction, he could have asked for an advisory opinion.10
"Until the employer so acted," the court concluded, "the determination of
the Director is the final determination of the National Board's jurisdiction.""
This Article considers the effects of advisory opinions on the jurisdiction
of state tribunals. Confronting these tribunals will be the question of whether
they may take jurisdiction under the Landrum-Griffin amendment to the
NLRA1 2 or whether they cannot take jurisdiction because of the doctrine of
federal pre-emption.13
Prior to the amendment to the NLRA in 1959, state agencies and
courts were deprived of jurisdiction over employers who were subject to the
act even though the NLRB declined to exercise its jurisdiction, unless the
Board had specifically ceded jurisdiction pursuant to section 10(a) of the
act.' 4 Thus, the "no-man's land" earlier alluded to was created.
Board, the jurisdictional issue will have already been decided, absent changes in relevant
jurisdictional facts.
7. 411 Pa. 360, 192 A.2d 707 (1963).
8. The letters had said that although a petition had been before the NLRB, the
petition was withdrawn because the Board was of the view that it could not properly
exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 367, 192 A.2d at 711-12. For the procedure through which
the petition was "withdrawn," see 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1963).
9. § 14(c) (2), added by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 164(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1963).
10. 411 Pa. at 371 n.8, 192 A.2d at 713-14 n.8.
11. Ibid.
12. 73 Stat. ,541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 164(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1963).
13. A leading case on this point is Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1
(1957).
14. [T]he Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or
Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry
(other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except
where predominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve
labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial
19631
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NLRB jurisdiction extends to labor disputes which tend to burden,
obstruct, or affect commerce. The NLRA contains appropriate definitions
for the terms "labor dispute,"' 15 "commerce,"
16 and "affecting commerce."1 7
Included under Board jurisdiction are both representation proceedings and
unfair labor practices proceedings. Historically, the Board limited its assertion
of jurisdiction to cases which had in its opinion a substantial effect on com-
merce.18 To guide the exercise of its discretion, the Board adopted jurisdic-
tional standards of a monetary nature, relating either to the gross volume
of business or to purchases or sales across state lines. The first standards
were adopted in 1950 and were modified in 1954.19 Four years later, in
response to the Supreme Court opinion in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd. ° and because of the receipt of additional appropriations, the NLRB
announced "new specific standards to guide it in asserting jurisdiction."
21
The two major standards were labeled "retail" and "nonretail." 22 Most em-
ployers were judged by one of these general standards, although certain
industries, including public utilities, transit systems, newspapers, and com-
munications systems, were accorded individual jurisdictional standards.
28 If
an employer fitted into the nonretail category, only a monetary standard had
to be met to show "statutory" or "legal" jurisdiction in the Board. 24 Where
the employer was characterized as retail, the Board would consider the nature
statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is incon-
sistent with the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a construc-
tion inconsistent therewith.
§ 10(a), as amended, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 1
6 0(a) (1958).
15. The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure
or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.
§ 2(9), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1958).
16. The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or
communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or
any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or
within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same
State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia
or any foreign country.
§ 2(6), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1958).
17. "The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute
burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." § 2(7), 61 Stat. 137
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1958).
18. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 3 (1957).
19. 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 7 (1958).
20. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
21. 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 8 (1958).
22. Ibid; see Siemon's Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958).
23. 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 8 (1958).
24. 25 NLRB ANN. REP. 19-20 (1960).
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of the employer's business and the impact of a labor dispute therein upon
commerce before asserting jurisdiction.2 5
THE 1959 AMENDMENT
Two principal lines of attack on the no-man's land were considered by
the Eighty-Sixth Congress at their Second Session in working out the section
14 amendment to the NLRA.2 6 The first attack directed itself at finding some
means of providing for state jurisdiction over disputes declined by the Board.
The second line of attack proposed would have required the NLRB to assert
jurisdiction over all employers covered by the act, but this scheme never
materialized. Congressmen Elliott and Shelley introduced H.R. 834227 and
8490,28 respectively. These bills supported the latter concept, requiring the
Board to "assert jurisdiction over all labor disputes arising under the Act."
The alternative device of placing jurisdiction into state hands began with
Senator Kennedy's S. 505, establishing a new section 14(c) which permitted
the Board to cede jurisdiction to the state "by agreement with any agency of
any state or territory." 29 Senator Goldwater's S. 748 would have amended
section 6 of the act by adding a new section 6(b) (1) providing the Board
"at its discretion, may, by rule or otherwise, decline to assert jurisdic-
tion .... ,,30 S. 1386, proposed by Senator McClellan, included a new section
14(c) (1) requiring the Board within 30 days after enactment to "clearly
establish and publish by rule or otherwise such limitations on its exercise of
jurisdiction as it proposes to observe."31 Bill S. 1555 as originally proposed
permitted the Board to enter into "agreement with any agency of any state."
32
As passed on April 25, 1959, S. 1555 gave jurisdiction to the states in cases
over which the Board has jurisdiction but "by rule or otherwise, has declined
to assert jurisdiction."33 H.R. 7265, introduced by Congressman Kearns, also
authorized the Board to decline jurisdiction "by rule or otherwise."3 4 Con-
gressman Landrum introduced H.R. 8400 which contained the present
language of section 14(c).35 The House Managers' Conference Report stated
in reference to the act as passed:
25. Id. at 20.
26. § 15(c), added by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 164(c) (Supp. IV. 1963).
Section 14(c) (1) is quoted in note 37 infra.
27. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT OF 1959, at 687 (1959).
28. Id. at 865.
29. Id. at 29.
30. Id. at 84.
31. Id. at 332.
32. Id. at 338.
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 586.
35. Id. at 619.
1963]
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The House amendment contains a provision which authorizes the
Board, in its discretion, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act to decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or
category of employers, where in the opinion of the Board, the effect
of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to
warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction. The House amendment pro-
vides further that nothing in the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts
of any State or territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) from assuming and asserting
jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board, in its discre-
tion, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act declines to assert jurisdiction.
8 6
In light of the legislative history, section 14(c) (1) does not give unlimited
freedom to decline jurisdiction but instead specifies that the Board must
follow certain means.
3 7
THE JURISDICTION GRANTED STATE TRIBUNALS
The NLRB issued regulation 102.9838 (advisory opinions on board
jurisdiction) for the purpose of providing a means of declining jurisdiction
so that state tribunals could take jurisdiction under the new section 14(c).39
Thus, in Meadow Stud, Inc.,40 an early advisory opinion, the Board stated,
"[W]e have determined to decline jurisdiction . . . thereby leaving the states
free to assert their jurisdiction." And in the companion case of William H.
Dixon,41 the following language appears:
We do not believe that State "labor relations acts" are the only means
of regulation, nor do we regard State labor relations boards as the
only State tribunals through which a State may assert jurisdiction
over labor disputes, especially in view of the congressional policy of
ceding to any State agency or any State court jurisdiction in those
areas where we decline. Since our declination of jurisdiction . . .
36. Id. at 934. (Emphasis added.)
37. The section reads as follows:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdic-
tion over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, .where,
in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not
sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That
the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over
which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1,
1959.
73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (Supp. IV, 1963).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 102.98 (1963).
39. 25 NLRB ANN. REP'. 19 (1960).
40. 130 N.L.R.B. 1202, 1204 (1961).
41. 130 N.L.R.B. 1204, 1207-08 (1961).
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leaves the States free to assert jurisdiction, . . . our declination ...
will not defeat the purposes of our Act.
In both cases the Board determined that it had statutory or legal jurisdiction
but elected to decline to exercise that jurisdiction on the ground that the
activities involved were essentially local in nature.
Shortly thereafter, two regional directors dismissed section 9(c) repre-
sentation and certification proceedings 42 involving similar employer activities.
Sustaining the directors' dismissals the Board relied upon its Meadow Stud,
Inc. and William H. Dixon advisory opinions. The District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled in favor of the Board when one of the employers
party to the section 9(c)(1) petition sought to compel the Board to assert
jurisdiction. However, upon review the court of appeals reversed the district
court and remanded the case to the NLRB. 43 In reference to the earlier
advisory opinions, Judge Danaher reasoned as follows:
The Board . . . would have us accept those two advisory opinions as
"rules of decision." We decline to do so.
We are firmly of the view that Congress did not intend as to an
entire class or category that states are to control conduct which is the
subject of national regulation upon the mere ipse dixit of the Board.
We are persuaded rather that Congress intended that jurisdiction as
to such class or category might be declined either (1) by rule-making
as provided in sections 6 and 14(c) of the Act, or (2) as the result
of hearings (which might culminate in a rule of decision, to be sure)
but hearings as an essential of due process, nevertheless.
If . . . there be a hearing, the rights of the appellants and other
parties may be defined, and the determination shall become a decision
42. Section 9(c) reads thus:
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such reg-
ulations as may be prescribed by the Board-
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor
organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of
employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their
employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative
defined in section 9(a), or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organiza-
tion, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their em-
ployer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as
defined in section 9(a) ; or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor
organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the repre-
sentative defined in section 9(a);
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe
that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an
officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommenda-
tions with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that
such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot
and shall certify the results thereof.
61 Stat. 144 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1958).
43. Hirsch v. McCulloch, 303 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
1963]
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with respect to the issues raised and considered and settled in that pro-
ceeding. The ad hoc rule so established by that decision under section
9(c) may in a later case satisfy the requirements of section 14(c)
that jurisdiction as to a class or category of employers thereafter
may be declined. Meanwhile, however, to meet the essentials of due
process, there will have become available the findings and conclusions
of the Board subject to judicial review.
44
The Board in October, 1962, issued its decision and order dealing with the
remanded case. 45 The Board stated:
The court noted that our advisory opinions in Meadow Stud and
William H. Dixon were not based on hearings and these opinions,
therefore, were not "rules of decision" within the meaning of Sec-
tion 14(c) (1) of the Act, under which the Board could decline to
assert jurisdiction over a representation dispute involving an entire
"class or category of employers." The court therefore held that the
Board has not yet determined in a proper manner . . . whether to
assert jurisdiction over the activities engaged in by these Employers.
46
The Board conducted hearings, considered the evidence, and concluded that
"although the operations of the racing industry affect commerce, the effect
of labor disputes involving these employers 'is not sufficiently substantial
to warrant the exercise of ... jurisdiction.' "47
Whether this means that the NLRB accepts the circuit court's reasoning
is not clear. Some indication that it does not or at least some indication that
it narrowly construes the circuit court's findings is found in the Board's
language in a later advisory opinion, Chartiers Country Club :48
The Board also rejects the Employer's second contention that the
Board cannot act herein because under Section 14(c) of the Act,
the Board can take jurisdictional action over "any class or category
of employers" only "by rule of decision or by published rules adopted
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act" and that an Advisory
Opinion is neither of these statutory alternatives. As the Board has
applied its current retail and nonretail standards only to the specific
Employer herein, and not to the class of employers to which it be-
longs, the Board finds that, aside from any other considerations,
the statutory limitations of Section 14(c) are inapplicable because
no "class or category of employers" is involved.
In the Chartiers case, as in the Kelley 49 case, the Board admitted the
absence of any specific jurisdictional standards for the employer's type of
44. Id. at 213.
45. Walter A. Kelley, 139 N.L.R.B. 744 (1962).
46. Id. at 744-45.
47. Id. at 746.
48. 139 N.L.R.B. 741, 743 (1962). (Footnote omitted.)
49. 139 N.L.R.B. 744 (1962).
[Vol. 68
NLRB ADVISORY OPINIONS
operation. Whether the Board would or should by this device avoid Judge
Danaher's ruling is subject to severe doubt.
This attempted application of jurisdictional standards without due process
was repeated in Muskegon Country Club.50 The Board finally decided upon
which jurisdictional standard to apply to country club employers as a class
in accordance with the requirements of due process in Walnut Hills Country
Club.51 In so doing the Board stated: "We therefore decide the question left
open in the El Paso and Chartiers Country Club decisions .... -"2 Due process
was obtained through the statutory investigation and hearing provisions of
section 9(c)(1) of the NLRA. The Board's characterization of its earlier
Chartiers Country Club advisory opinion as a "decision" would seem to
indicate that Judge Danaher's admonition has fallen upon deaf ears.
Very recently the Board has taken another position with regard to its
advisory opinion procedure. In City Line Open Hearth, Inc.,5" the Board
states:
The rendering of advisory services to state tribunals and to the
parties to proceedings before such tribunals flows from the Board's
statutory authority to administer the Act and is an incident of the
Board's responsibilities under the Act even in the absence of pending
Board proceedings. Furthermore, the Board's Advisory Opinion
procedures are sanctioned under Section 6 of the Act, wherein the
Board is authorized "to make . . . such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act."
Nothing contained in section 6 of the act 54 sanctions avoidance by the Board
of the specific legislative requirements of section 14(c) (1) and (2).r5
Objections have been raised to the advisory opinion procedure. In Jemcon
Broadcasting Co.,56 the Board attempted to answer an objection based on due
process:
Nor is there any merit to the contention that the Board's Advisory
Opinion procedure deprives the Employer of due process. By their
very nature, such procedures do not contemplate holding a hearing
as they were devised merely to give advice to parties in a State pro-
ceeding and to the State court or agency before whom the proceeding
50. 144 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (1963).
51. 145 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1963).
52. Emphasis supplied.
53. 141 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (1963).
54. National Labor Relations Act § 6, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1958).
55. In City Line the Board applied its retail standard to the employer. Thus, this
employer fell into a category as to which standards had been properly established. See
in this connection p. 35 infra.
56. 135 N.L.R.B. 362 (1962).
1963]
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may be pending as to whether, on the facts submitted, the Board
would or would not assert jurisdiction.
5 7
And a little later in Terrizzi Beverage Co.58 the Board concluded, "[T]he
fact that neither [of the employers] are parties to the . . . proceeding herein
would not prevent the Board from asserting jurisdiction . . .59
Judge Danaher's decision in Hirsch v. McCulloch6" appeared to say
that advisory opinions could not be employed for purposes of giving a state
tribunal jurisdiction where there has been no commerce standard determined
earlier for the class of employers involved in the petition for advisory opinion.
Even if the Board seeks to apply one of its "general" standards (retail or
nonretail), does not procedural due process have to be observed in deter-
mining its applicability?
The description of the Board's proceeding as an "advisory opinion" is
an unfortunate use of terminology as far as the Board's use of their opinions
as "rules of decision" is concerned. As the court points out in Hirsch6x the
expression "rules of decision" is used not only in section 14(c) but in sections
9(c) (2) and 9(c) (4)62 of the national act. The Judge also refers to another
federal statute where, as he puts it, "Congress has given status to 'rules of
decision.' "6 He cites Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll64 as distinguishing between
decisions and opinions.
The term rules of decision received distinguished use in the classic case
of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins65 where the Supreme Court said that "federal
courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply
as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written."
In the earlier Vermont case of E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co. v. City of Burling-
ton 6 the Vermont Court reasoned:
By "a rule of decision" as the term is used ... is meant that the
common law adopted in this state is the law of this state, and is to
be administered as such by our courts. It is the foundation of our
jurisprudence, and, except as modified or repealed by statute, its
rules and principles determine the rights of, and prescribe rules of
57. Id. at 367.
58. 137 N.L.R.B. 495 (1962).
59. Id. at 498. Nor did the Board agree with the argument that it should not assert
jurisdiction because possibly an unfair labor practice did not exist. "Advisory opinions
are rendered only on the jurisdictional issue presented by the facts submitted, and the
Board will not presume to render an opinion on whether the subjecet matter of the
dispute is governed by the Act." Ibid.
60. 303 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
61. Id. at 213.
62. As amended, 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2) & (4) (1958).
63. 303 F.2d at 213.
64. 57 U.S. 275, 286 (1853).
65. 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938).
66. 175 At. 35, 42 (Vt. 1934).
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conduct for, all persons, and such rules and principles are to be
followed and applied by our courts in all cases to which they are
applicable.
The effect given a rule of decision suggests the basis of the requirement
that there be a hearing for its formulation. Once the essentials of due process
have been observed in an initial hearing leading to the formulation of a rule,
subsequent application of this rule does not require a full hearing. This was
recognized by Judge Danaher in Hirsch.
A logical interpretation of section 14(c) (1) warrants the conclusion that
where there is a standard already established by rule of decision or published
rule pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, some device such as
section 102.98 could be employed by which the already existing standard would
be applied by the Board to the submitted commerce data. One would expect,
however, the Board to dismiss a petition which involves considerations other
than the routine application of pre-existing monetary standards. Usually the
Board has, either for lack of information or for lack of appropriateness of the
subject matter. Thus, in Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd.67 the Board dis-
missed the petition after concluding that the issue presented was really one
of appropriate unit determination. And in Interlake S.S. Co. 68 the Board
stated :
The issues posed herein by the Petitioner relate to whether the Union
is a "labor organization" within the meaning of the Act and whether
the Union's picketing activities constitute violations of the Act. As
these issues do not concern questions of the applicability of the
Board's discretionary commerce standards, they do not fall within
the intendment of the Board's advisory opinion rules.
Earlier, in Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd.,69 the Board had remarked:
The Board's informal Advisory Opinion procedures generally do not
lend themselves to the development of the full and complete record
essential to enable the Board to make an informed judgment on ...
important jurisdictional issues . . . like the instant one. Determina-
tion of such jurisdictional issues requires an adequate presentation
based upon a full and complete record, not present here . ...
Notwithstanding those observations, the Board seems willing to stretch
for jurisdiction on occasion. Consider the case of Central Electric Supplies
Co0.7 The Board asserted jurisdiction under its nonretail standard after
"assuming" that the Employer's annual inflow, both direct and indirect, con-
stituted inflow within the meaning of the Board's standard. The Board
67. 138 N.L.R.B. 1451 (1962).
68. 138 N.L.R.B. 576, 576-77 (1962).
69. 138 N.L.R.B. 221, 222 (1962).
70. 139 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1962).
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commented that its assumption "appears to be reasonable. 7 1 Consider also
the case of Spears-Dehner, Inc.,72 in which the Board predicated assertion of
jurisdiction upon a "reasonable assumption" that the employer had the
requisite amount of nonretail inflow. In a footnote the Board remarked that it
did not therefore have to rely upon another "reasonable assumption" which
would have established jurisdiction.7 The employer argued that no jurisdic-
tion should be asserted because there was no unfair labor practice pending
in reference to the conduct complained of. This argument was rejected, the
Board "assuming, without deciding, ' 74 such a practice existed in order to
restrict the advisory opinion to the commerce aspect of jurisdiction.
In several cases the Board has declined to make such assumptions, instead
noting that the commerce data is insufficient for purposes of asserting juris-
diction and dismissing the petition. This was the procedure in H. W. Woody.
75
Similarly, the Better Elec. Co.76 opinion dismissed the petition because
the evidence on direct inflow was not clear. And in Hoisting & Portable
Engineers Local 101 77 the petition was dismissed since the Board could not
tell from the facts furnished whether the union conduct affected other
secondary employers so as to combine with the primary employer for pur-
poses of meeting the nonretail jurisdictional standard. For some reason in
the case of Chartiers Country Club7s the Board did not dismiss the petition
after determining that there was insufficient information concerning the direct
and indirect inflow of the employer. Instead the Board declined jurisdiction.
PRE-EMPTION
Whether pre-emption will occur is fairly clear in certain kinds of cases.
If the issue before a state tribunal is one of representation and certification
rights under a state statute, a proper 79 assertion of jurisdiction by the Board
will pre-empt the state tribunal,80 and it must dismiss the proceeding. The
result is the same when the subject matter of the state tribunal's proceeding
relates to the question of whether certain union conductis prohibited by the
state's labor relations act, and a problem arises as to whether the state labor
relations board may handle the claim. If the National Board properly asserts
71. Id. at 1209.
72. 139 N.L.R.B. 922 (1962).
73. Id. at 924 n.3.
74. Id. at 924.
75. 125 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1959).
76. 129 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1960).
77. 137 N.L.R.B. 1788 (1962).
78. 139 N.L.R.B. 741 (1962).
79. The terms "proper" and "properly" as used in this discussion connote a Board
proceeding which observes the elements of due process mentioned by Judge Danaher in
Hirsch.
80. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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jurisdiction over the employer, then the union's conduct with reference to
this employer, although violative of the state act, is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRB, and again the state is pre-empted.8
But the pre-emption doctrine may not apply when the state tribunal is
a court of law, and the issue is the legality of certain conduct under state
law other than a local labor relations act. The NLRB has uniformly held that
its jurisdictional determination through an advisory opinion does not deal
with the question of whether the matter in dispute is subject to the NLRA.
In Spears-Dehner, Inc., the Board said,
82
The Board does not presume to render an Advisory Opinion on the
merits of any case or on the question of whether the subject matter
of the controversy is governed by the Act. (see Section 101.40(e)
of the Board's Statements of Procedure). .. . Advisory Opinions are
limited to .. .whether the commerce operations of the Employer
are such that the Board would assert jurisdiction over them ....
This self-imposed limitation would seem to leave the state court faced
with the question of whether the conduct alleged is "arguably subject to"8 3
the protections of section 784 or the prohibitions of section 885 of the NLRA.
Thus the advisory opinion would only determine for the court whether it
needed to apply the arguably-subject-to test before it could apply the statutory
common law of the state to the conduct involved. If the board declines juris-
diction the test would not have to be applied.
Terrizzi Beverage Co. v. Local No. 83086 is a good example of what has
been discussed. Prior to the Pennsylvania supreme court decision, while the
matter was before the lower court with the employer seeking an injunction,
the union petitioned for an advisory opinion. Therein the Labor Board ruled
that it would assert jurisdiction based upon the commerce data of the
secondary employer.8 7 The supreme court's opinion stated:
It is our considered conclusion that the activities complained
of . . . are "arguably" within the purview of Section 8(b) (4) (i)
(ii) (B) of the Federal statute ... and that the Pennsylvania courts
must, therefore, yield jurisdiction.
We consider it significant, but not conclusive, that the National
Labor Relations Board has issued an advisory opinion ...wherein
it asserts it will assume jurisdiction. 8
81. Ibid.
82. 139 N.L.R.B. 922, 924 (1962).
83. See Terrizzi Beverage Co. v. Local 830, 408 Pa. 380, 184 A.2d 243 (1962).
84. As amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
85. As amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
86. 408 Pa. 830, 184 A.2d 243 (1962).
87. 137 N.L.R.B. 495 (1962).
88. 408 Pa. at 385, 184 A.2d at 245.
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In this case the Board asserted jurisdiction. Of course, if instead the Board
had declined jurisdiction then the Pennsylvania state court could have applied
state law as if the NLRB had asserted jurisdiction, but the state court had
concluded that the arguably-subject-to test did not deprive it of jurisdiction.
Any dismissal of an advisory opinion petition because of insufficient informa-
tion or because of improper scope of question would in no way be deter-
ninative of the state court's jurisdiction.
There are also a few specific types of labor controversies in which pre-
emption is not a problem because the doctrine does not apply. If the case
concerns itself with picket line violence, for example, the state court can
proceed to grant relief regardless of NLRB jurisdiction over the employerY81
CONCLUSIONS
Advisory opinions are not rules of decision. Due process of law requires
a hearing by the NLRB before establishment of any jurisdictional standard.
Procedures similar to those called for in section 9(c) (1) of the NLRA
leading to a Board "decision" would be proper, as would published rules
adopted pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
When the Board's advisory opinion applies an already established and
applicable jurisdictional standard to the commerce data submitted, the extent
to which jurisdiction is thereby ceded under section 14(c) (1) and (2) of
the NLRA depends on whether the issue before the state is one of repre-
sentation rights or illegal conduct. If it involves representation rights then
the Board's decision to assert jurisdiction will be determinative of the state's
jurisdiction; it is pre-empted. Where the Board declines jurisdiction then the
state has jurisdiction pursuant to section 14(c)(1) and (2). If the issue
before the state concerns illegal conduct then the Board's advisory opinion is
determinative inasmuch as state administrative agency action is concerned.
If the Board declines jurisdiction, then presumably the employer is subject
to the state's jurisdiction under applicable state statutes. If the Board asserts
jurisdiction then the state administrative agency is pre-empted.
In the case of state court action the issuance of an advisory opinion has
the effect of determining the applicability of state law. The advisory opinion
will serve to tell the state court whether or not it must apply the arguably-
subject-to test before local law can be brought to bear on the litigation.
89. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Workers, 353 Pa. 446, 46 A.2d 16
(1946).
